On September
11th 2001, America lost over three thousand people when nineteen
terrorists hijacked and crashed airplanes into the World Trade Center in NY,
Pentagon and Pennsylvania. That’s day, America became a nation at war with Al
Qaeda and states that sponsored terrorism. Just few weeks after terrorists
brought down the twin towers and part of the Pentagon, American Intelligent
communities linked this horrific attacks to Osman Bin Laden suspected to be
living somewhere in Afghanistan. Afghanistan being a country ruled by Taliban,
President George W. Bush declared war ordering the U.S. military to destroy Al
Qaeda and Taliban government in Afghanistan (Tanner, 2009, p. 324). Wiping out Al Qaeda, getting rid of the
Taliban government in Afghanistan and instituting a pro American’s government
were the main goals that President George W. Bush articulated to achieve in
Afghanistan. My position in this paper is clear, I argued that U.S. and its
allies are close to lose the stabilization and reconstruction battle
Without a doubt, President George W. Bush
was able to partially achieve all these three things before he left office. The
U.S. and it allies were able to crashed Al Qaeda, overthrew the Taliban
government and helped elected a democratic government headed by President Hamid
Karzai. With much of Taliban and Al Qaeda infrastructures destroyed and many
terrorists killed. Security situation started
to look good as humanitarian developmental projects started to take shape. Humanitarian
organizations started to deliver food assistances to many Afghans, social
programs like building clinics, hospitals and schools sprang up in some areas.
For instance, United States Agency for International Development reported the
building of about 10,000 schools, 6.5 million children enrolled in schools with
36.3% being girls and, about 6,865 adult learning centers opened in dozen of
provinces (U.S. Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, 2010).
On the economic front, Afghanistan’s
economy grew at the rate of 12% by the end of 2007, 3.4% in 2009 according to
U.S. Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs.
Agricultural sector grew as well, roads and bridges constructions
expanding, and for the first time since Taliban took power, electricity was
nearly restored in Kabul providing electric power to four million Afghans. Moreover, the health of the Afghanistan people
improved. With the help of the United States and international humanitarian
organizations, more health facilities were built employing thousands of health
care workers in Kabul and other cities. For the first time since Taliban
government left, child mortality deaths were reduced by 23% saving more than
800,000 newborn babies a year (U.S. Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs,
2009). In addition, about 7 millions babies were vaccinated against Polio,
Tuberculosis, Tetanus and basic healthcare training programs opened in 13
provinces around the country (U.S. Bureau of South and Central Asia, 2010).
More importantly, as a result of United
States and its allies’ relentless campaigns against Al Qaeda and Taliban’s
remnants, security situation improved in Kabul and in some provinces. The
coalition’s campaigns briefly appeared to be a success. There were few Al Qaeda
and Taliban attacks against the U.S. and its allies’ forces, fewer attacks
against civil organizations, fewer incidents of improvised explosives devices (IEDs).
For instance the U.S. coalition suffered only fifty seven fatal casualties in
2003, down from the previous year (Tanner, 2009). NATO allies began to feel
like they were gaining an upper hand in their fight against Al Qaeda and
Taliban across the country. Meanwhile in
the United States, the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, and Lt General
McNeil commander of the United States forces in Afghanistan along the President
of United States, George W. Bush in 2003, were singing the victory song all
agreeing that, “the major combat operation against Al Qaeda and Taliban is
ended and U.S. and NATO will shift their focus to stabilizing and rebuilding
the country” (Tanner, 2009.P. 330).
Judging by looking at these indices,
starting with the overthrowing of the Taliban government, killing of Al Qaeda
top officials, election of President Karzai, successful parliamentary elections,
building of the national security
apparatus, construction of schools, hospitals, clinics, increased in the number
of young people going back to school
particularly girls. The rapid growth of the Afghanistan's economy, progress in
healthcare sector and fewer deaths of U.S. and allies' troops as well as
decreased in civilian deaths- all indicated what appeared as a success for the
United States and its allies. The problem is these relative accomplishments
happened between 2001 and 2005. Of
course much changed since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, with respect to
the reconstruction process in Afghanistan.
With the United States involved in another
war in Iraq, Afghanistan rebuilding and reconstruction efforts took the back
seat as United States focused more time and resources to fighting Saddam
Hussein’s regime. This shifts in the level of resources and personnel from
Afghanistan to Iraq both culminated into unfortunate situation in Afghanistan
in respect to reconstruction and stabilization processes. The security situations started to
deteriorate, Al Qaeda and Taliban militants remerged in areas where NATO allies
initially thought to have secured. Consequentially, the number of allies’ casualties
started to rise as Taliban and Al Qaeda increased their attacks on U.S. and
allies’ troops e.g. the use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and roadside
bombs contributed to more allies’ deaths (Katzman, 2011).
The shift in the level of resources and
personnel from Afghanistan to Iraq eased the level of pressure on the Taliban
as well as revealing that U.S. and NATO did not have enough man power to
control most areas in the countryside anymore. As a result, the Taliban started
to coerce local people to abandon their supports to foreigners. This reversal
of loyalty by the local people from being pro NATO allies back to supporting
the Taliban and Al Qaeda completely undermined the progresses that have been
made. The result became visible as an insurgency level against the United States
and its allies’ rose sharply. In addition, humanitarian and reconstruction
projects got stalled as Taliban and Al Qaeda regained control in some provinces
in Southern and Eastern provinces.
As attacks against U.S. and NATO forces
increased, instability started to spread across the country. Areas like Helmand and Kandahar provinces
started to experience increased attacks coming from Taliban and Al Qaeda
elements. This of course became a serious challenge to those who have joined
the Afghanistan nation army and those still thinking about joining. The Taliban and Al Qaeda have made it clear.
Anyone supporting foreign invaders will be targeted and killed (Katzman,
2009). Therefore, many Afghans who have
joined the national army and police started to desert the Afghanistan military
to rejoin the Taliban and Al Qaeda for fear of reprisal.
This subsequently resulted into many
people quitting the Afghanistan army which precipitated into the weakening of
the national security apparatus. It also
sent a powerful message to President Hamid Karzai to stop working with the
foreigners as it was evident in Taliban failed assassination attempt on Karzai
life during the military parade in January of 2008 in Kabul (Katzman, 2009).
As this literature reviews revealed, much
of the successes made by the United States and NATO allies’ have been reversed
or weaken. This raises the question of whether the United States and its
allies’ have lost grip of the situation in Afghanistan and if so, what did the
United States and NATO did wrong that resulted into such quick reversal of the
security stabilization and reconstruction gains in Afghanistan. My position in
this paper is clear, I argued that U.S. and its allies are close to lose the
stabilization and reconstruction battle and here’s why:
First, the United States military strategy
of offensive campaign against Taliban and Al Qaeda has proved ineffective. The United States and its allies might have
killed thousands of militants as well as liberating several districts across
Afghanistan. However, the same offensive
campaigns have caused a lot of collateral damages e.g. used of unmanned drone and airstrikes on
certain unverified targets have turned
many Afghans against the United States and allies troops as well as against humanitarian
organizations. The Taliban and Al Qaeda militants
have taken advantage of the unfortunate civilian’s casualties and they have
used it as recruiting mechanism to enlist hundreds of Afghanistan’s civilians
who have become dissatisfied with the way in which the United States and allies
are executing the war on terrorism in their country.
The
truth is winning hearts and minds of the Afghans is not going to be about how
many Taliban and Al Qaeda militants the U.S. and NATO killed or captured.
Instead, it is going to be about protecting civilians and work with them to
craft an engaging plan on how to conduct security stabilization and
reconstruction programs. This would
require the United States and NATO allies to stop dictating the Karzai on how
to deal with the local traditional leaders. Instead, the U.S. and its allies
should encourage Karzai to negotiate with the traditional rulers as well as
with moderate Taliban who are willing to abandon extremism in favor of becoming
a part of the new Afghanistan government.
Pushing Karzai so hard on things like
curbing corruption is putting Karzai government at old with many influential
elements. There has to be understanding that corruption is a common aspect of
the Afghanistan’s society. If it means that buying off local leaders and
moderate Taliban militants to help put the country on a right path, then, it’s
should be encouraged for the time being to help Kabul government gains traction
in its efforts to stabilize the security situation in the country.
Second, over the last 7 years, U.S. and
its allies have been micro-managing rebuilding programs that should have been
left to local Afghans who understand the immediate needs for their
societies. This has not gone well with
many Afghans who felt that U.S. and its western allies have been enforcing
western leaning social programs against the Afghanistan’s local cultures e.g.
coercing girls to attend schools built by western humanitarian organizations to
learn English. An initiative like this proves to local people that America is
there to impose foreign cultures against their culture and customs.
Instead of the United States dictating
what social programs to build and where to build them, U.S. and its allies
should recognize and respect the local people and their cultures. This would require creating local Afghanistan’s
reconstruction team in every district because these are people who understand
the local needs. Doing so would make local people feel respected and this would
ultimately result into them cooperating with the United States and its allies
in rebuilding efforts. This would also serve as neutralizing tool for the
United States and its NATO allies by creating a collaborating commitment and
partnership between the local Afghans and the coalition forces as well as
denying extremists any opportunity to exploit the local populations.
Third, on the democratic transformation
front, United States and its allies have been pursuing wrong kind of democratic
reform. By my own judgment, failure to institute democratic institutions across
the country is not that Afghans don’t like or embrace democracy. The problem is
that the democratic government led by President Hamid Karzai was formed with
less inclusion from all the stakeholders in the country. Moreover, it is
ineffective, corrupt and does not guarantee security and neither does it uphold
the rule of law against the criminal elements across the country. President Karzai and many other top ministers
are parts of what exacerbates the level of corruption in the country. Their
participation in the corruption does not send good example to encourage other
people to fight against corruption. As
long people like Karzai who encourages corruption are left in power, Afghans
will continue to lose faiths in the government. They may instead choose to back
the Taliban who once guaranteed their families with security as oppose to back
a democratic process that doesn’t even secure safety in Kabul.
Fourth, U.S. foreign policy in Afghanistan
is unbalanced and doesn’t serve U.S. geopolitically. If U.S.
doesn’t want to repeat the
mistake of past, then, the United States needs to formulate regional foreign
policy that balances the balance of power in this region. Unfortunately over the last few years,
America has established a cozy relationship with Afghanistan and India as well
as encouraging Afghanistan to establish a friendly relationship with India
[e.g. U.S. giving nuclear aid to India and not Pakistan]. This kind of behavior
by the U.S has elevated the level of
animosity that now exists between India and Pakistan particularly over Kashmir
region as well causing political tension along the Afghanistan-Pakistan borders
where Pakistani government allows Taliban militants to move freely to
Afghanistan due lack of cooperation between the two states. The point is,
without a balanced regional foreign policy. It is going to be difficult to
contain the situation in Afghanistan particularly in lawless areas along the
Afghanistan-Pakistan border.
In summary, for NATO allies to win the
security stabilization and reconstruction battle in Afghanistan, they need to
stop dictating programs. Instead, they
should work with local people, tradition leaders, moderate Taliban and recognize
local cultures and respect them. Let the Afghans be the ones that direct the
social programs. Moreover, U.S. needs to make a tough decision about Karzai. His
alleged involvement in corruption scheme raises the question about his
leadership to lead this fragile coalition government. Finally, there is an
urgency to come up with a foreign policy that doesn’t create animosity among
the regional states. If the United
States and its allies corrected their policies as discussed above, it’s my
belief that stabilization and reconstruction battle in Afghanistan can be won.
Not doing so would mean that, there is a great danger that NATO coalition
forces may lose this battle.
References
Katzman,
K. (2011). Afghanistan: Post-Taliban governance, security, and U.S. policy. Congressional Research Service.
Retrieved September 6, 2011, from: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30588.pdf
Tanner,
S. (Revised Ed.). (2009). Afghanistan: A military history from
Alexander the great to the war against the Taliban. Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania: Da Capo Press.
United
States Department. (2009). Background notes: Afghanistan. United
States Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs. Retrieved September 5,
2011, from: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5380.htm
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