Darfur, Land, Oil, and Identity Struggle: The Case of Darfur's Conflict

Water, Land, Oil, and Identity Struggle: The case of Darfur’s Conflict

Authorship: Phillip Manyok, NSU Graduate Student of Conflict Analysis and Resolution

-Abstract-
This paper explores Sudan’s complex history. The attention is focused on colonial history and how it has affected the present situation. The issue addresses in this paper include historical state failure/local law and order, power struggle between President Bashir’s regime, and an Islamic ideologue, Dr. Turabi, discover of oil in Darfur, marginalization/oppression, environmental changes, and identity confusion between an African’s tribes and the so call Arab’s tribes as well global factors like China oil connection in Sudan. In this paper, conflict multifaceted world view or theory is used as the framework of analysis. The paper concludes with personal assessment of the Darfur situation.

-Darfur conflict background-

Before 2003, people knew little about Darfur, only those who might have read Sudan history knew about it. For the sake of those who are not familiar with Darfur history. It is however important to revisit Sudan’s colonial history. At the dawn of 19th century, British ruled Sudan including the western region. At the time, this region was inhabited by African tribes (Sebastian, 2006). After Sudan officially became British colony, British colonial government established policies that resulted into an economic and political marginalization of the region. Among these policies included the use of Arabs to govern different parts of the country. In return, the Arabs were promised certain privileges. They were given access to education, economic and even some political freedoms. As a result of the British’s indirect rule, many parts of the country including Darfur became neglected or isolated from the central authority in Khartoum (Sebastian, 2006).

After independence, things barely changed, Khartoum continued with the British policies to further isolate Darfur. The political and socio-economic institutions remained in the hands of Arabs’ government in Khartoum (Sebastian, 2006). Since then, political relation between the central government and people of Darfur grew apart. In 2003, the situation got worse when African’s tribes formed two rebel groups Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) to fight against central government in Khartoum (Sebastian, 2006).

However, the formation of these movements was just a part of conflict which started way back in 1985. During the 1980s, Libyan Dictator Gaddafi sent Libyan’s troops to Darfur region to deliver aid to some nomadic tribes. It was Gaddafi’s government which complicated ethnic relations among the Darfur people. Gaddafi armed the nomadic tribes and encouraged some to embrace Islam. As a result, relations among the Darfur people got radically changed. Those who identified with new Arab’s identity began to identify themselves as Arabs (Sebastian, 2006). For those who are familiar with Sudanese politics, Darfur has never been divided by religion or ethnicity. They are from mosaic tribes, most of them Muslims and Black Africans.


However, with the introduction of Arab identity, Khartoum over time forged a new relationship with nomadic tribes. During the civil war between North and South Sudan, Khartoum was able to recruit the nomadic people of Darfur to fight alongside it troops against the Southern Sudanese in a war which just ended five years ago. At the same time, Khartoum managed to supply the Janjaweeds with firearms against the Darfur’s African tribes. As a result, an ethnic polarization was erected where none had existed (Sebastian, 2996).

In 2003, resentment against Khartoum and the nomadic tribes supported by Khartoum’s regime became explosive. The two main rebel groups Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) attacked government troops and killed several of them. In an act of retaliation, Khartoum responded by unleashing its Arabs militias known as the Janjaweeds which it armed with modern weapons to against the African tribes (Sebastian, 2006). The unleashing of the Janjaweeds against rebel groups started what is today known as the Darfur conflict in which over 400,000 have died as of today, and millions of people displaced, several homes destroyed, gross human rights abuses committed such as women and young girls being raped, people limbs and arms cut off, crops cut down and animal slaughtered (Sebastian, 2006).
Framework of analysis

To better understand the nature of Darfur’s conflict. There has to be a unit of analysis or framework to help people understand what happened and how it happened. In this paper, conflict multifaceted theory is used as the framework of analysis. According to Docherty (2001, p. 23), conflict experts and educators through their researches theorized that conflicts are caused by different factors. These factors according to Docherty (2001, p. 22-23), range from incompatibility of interest and position, resources unbalanced, poor communication, and lack of governing institutions. The belief that conflicts are caused by different variables constituted what Docherty (2001) calls conflict worldview. This paper defines multifaceted conflict theory as, “a theory that explains the occurrence of conflict as a result of different factors.” Put it differently, according to multifaceted framework, there is no single cause of conflict. Each conflict situation has different set of factors that cause it. Hence, addressing each conflict requires people to approach each situation differently.


Using this framework, it is arguable to say that Darfur’s conflict is characterized by different factors. However, this paper addresses them as conflict narratives because their meanings depend on who tells the story. There are seven broad narratives that are related to the situation in Darfur namely, colonial unresolved legacies, collapse of regional/local institutions, power struggle between President Bashir’s regime, and an Islamic ideologue, Dr. Turabi, discovery of oil in Darfur, marginalization/oppression, environmental changes, and identity confusion between African’s tribes and the so call Arab’s tribes (Janjaweeds).

Starting with the nature of state, Sudan since its independent has been a failed state. For the most part of its existence, Sudan has never had any stable government that effectively governed the whole country (Sebastian, 2006). It has been fragmented into several autonomous regions. For examples, South Sudan and Northern Sudan have been ruled by separate governments. Adding to what was already a fractured country, Darfur has started to identify itself as a separate region from the rest of the country. This new political reality in Darfur has been exacerbated by underdevelopment and lack of social institutions that hold people together. Due to systematic marginalization of the region, there have been strong beliefs among the people of Darfur that Khartoum’s regime has failed to treat its citizens equally. This over time has caused a sense of frustration and anger among the regional tribes. Because of this, many people in the region felt like they are entitled to their own self government, a political reality that Khartoum’s authority does not want to recognize (Wax, 2006).

For many years, Southern Sudan as well as Darfur viewed central government in Khartoum as lacking legitimacy well as having lost its obligation to fulfill its duties of protecting and keeping regions together. Each region recognized that successive Khartoum’s governments to have turned against its people. This created political opposition against central government in Khartoum particularly from Southern Sudan and Darfur where people have lost faith in Khartoum ability to treat people equally (Sebastian, 2006).
Put it differently, competition for political power have put regions at odd with Khartoum as well against each other. For example, Southern Sudan and Darfur identify themselves differently. The Southern Sudanese identify themselves more with African cultures and African religions. For Darfur, there is a mixed identity, some people identify themselves as Africans while others identify themselves as Arabs whereas others combine African heritage with Islamic cultures (Verney, 2004).


In recent years, relationship between nomadic and farming communities in Darfur got exacerbated by three factors. First, there is a problem with the tradition system of land, and water resource. Before the British ventured into Sudan, the land ownership was based on kinship in which tribes oversaw the distribution of resources particularly land and water resources Verney, 2004). After independence, the old system of land ownership became discredited or abandoned in most parts in the region. The decision to abandon traditional land ownership system, and failure by the central government in Khartoum to establish effective mechanisms of land management encouraged some people to scramble for all the land they can get. Without policies on how to use or share the land and water, each community has been forced to to claim the right to the use of these resources resulted into constant struggle between farming communities and animals’ herders (Suleiman, 2005).

Secondly, the fight over land and water in Darfur has been made worst by a drastic ecological change in the environment in the recent years (An-Naim, 2004). Over the last 20 years, there have been signs that land is eroding, lakes, and local rivers are drying up putting burden on the limited usable land and water resources. This in particular has made it hard for communities who their livelihoods depend on rain water (An-Naim, 2004). In most areas in the region, there have been irregularities in the amount of rainfall as well as shorter rainfall seasons compared to decade before 1980 (Milani, 2006). This has resulted into disruption of farming activities in the region.

Moreover, environmental climate change has increased the magnitude of desertification of the farming land resulting into collapse of farming activities and internal migration. For example, before 1980, both farming and nomadic tribes used to depend on each other. Those from Northern Darfur used to travel southwest with their animals during the dried seasons and were always accommodated by the farming tribes. During the last fifteen years, environmental changes have increased competition over usable land and limited water resources (Milani, 2006).

For farming communities, this means, they have to protect water supplies and preserve portion of the fertile land from being tampered with by the cattle, sheep and goats herders. The same is true for animals’ herders. They wanted to have access to the same limited water supplies that the farming communities are trying to protect. As a result of each community thriving to protect these limited resources, and the other wanting to have access to the same limited resources. Relationship between the two became saturated and tension grew resulting into periodic confrontation that some people believed to have caused the current Darfur (Wax, 2006).

Third, there have been systemic collapses of law and order in this region (An-Naim, 2004). As said earlier, Sudan has been in war with itself for the last half of a century. This has left many areas in the country ungovernable including Darfur. For a region big as the size of Western Europe, lack of governing institutions translated into lack of law and order. However, coupling this situation with the availability of guns and automatic rifles, local bandits and anarchists took advantage of lawlessness. They have used it as an opportunity to pursue their own interests without fear from being punished by any authority. In fact, this has been part of what is happening in Darfur. Lawlessness has turned people against themselves as it has been the case between the Janjaweeds and the rebel groups (An-Naim, 2004).

Although some people in Darfur would claim to be ethnically different. People may expect that ethnicity to be the core of the Darfur conflict. Unfortunately, the reality in Darfur is completely the opposite. It is false religious identity which plays a major part (Washington, 2006). Those from Northern Darfur who speak Arabic and who over the years have held close contacts with mainstream Islamic cultures have assumed an Arab identity. They call themselves Arabs while those in Southern Darfur who still speak African’s indigenous languages call themselves Africans (Verney, 2004).

Consequentially, the result has been a primordial identity confusion and ethnic polarization between those who identified themselves as Africans and those who considered themselves as Arabs. Put it differently, identify confusion and ethnic polarization have created a buffered zone between the two communities. A buffered area each group doesn’t want the other one to cross. Moreover importantly, this buffered zone has resulted into political exploitation by those their interests are best served by exploiting peoples’ differences for personal gains (Verney, 2004).

For a region in which lot of people are illiterate or less informed, lack of self awareness or what Lederach calls self conscientization can be easily exploited by those who have hidden motives (Lederach, 1995, p. 19 &26). It also means that people who are ill-informed may not understand the conflict dynamic. In worse cases, ill-informed people are vulnerable to people manipulations. In fact, I would argue that there might be some people in the Darfur who if asked about why they are fighting, who might not provide any good reason except may be to point to broader narratives they hear from others.

As with most conflict situations, without correct conflict identification, efforts to explore potential remedies become impossible. The conflict in Darfur seems to have been characterized by the lack of the conflict identification (Wax, 2006). Some people for example defined Darfur conflict as an ethnic conflict, others called it a religious conflict and some people called it a struggle over political and economic institutions. The point is, without common conflict definition in Darfur. It hard for parties involved in the conflict as well as third parties who are interested to find remedies to the Darfur’s conflict.

Moreover, Darfur is being used as a battleground by different factions. For those who are familiar with Sudanese’ internal politics, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) have different positions or interests (Verney, 2004). SLM and JEM blamed Khartoum’s government for it support for the Janjaweeds. They claimed that Sudanese government armed the Janjaweeds to attack and kill black Africans (Amnesty International, n.d.). The rebel groups alleged that Khartoum supports for the Janjaweeds or its failure to stop Janjaweeds from attacking African’s tribes is what caused them to rebel against the government. To the rebels, Khartoum’s government is viewed as an aggressor who is responsible for the suffering of the Darfur’s people. Khartoum’s government on the other hand blamed the rebel groups for the deterioration of the situation. It blamed both rebel groups for their not willing to work collaboratively with central government to address the Darfur’s situation (Verney, 2004).

In addition, the war in Darfur is a part of the political struggle between President Bashiir and Dr. Al Turabi. Since relation between president Bashiir and his former mentor, Dr. Turabi restrained in 2000. Bashiir government has arrested Turabi on charges that he has been working with the Darfur’s rebels to destabilize his government (Verney, 2004). Bashiir personally linked Turabi to at least two incidences of coups that occurred in Khartoum in the last seven years. Turabi on the other hand blamed president Bashiir for deterioration of situation in Darfur. He has publicly accused Bashiir of supporting the Janjaweeds in Darfur, an accusation that Bashiir has denied (Verney, 2004).

In 2004, Bashir’s government arrested 30 members of Turabi’ Popular Congress Party (PCP) in Darfur on the charge they have been working with the rebels to overthrow the central government (Suleiman, 2005). Turabi during interview defended that his men were arrested on baseless political allegation. He denied his connection to Darfur and said his men have nothing to do with the rebels in Darfur. During the same interview, Turabi accused Khartoum of purposely neglecting and marginalizing the Darfur people because they were of black Africans. In general, political rivalry between Turabi and Bashiir has made Darfur crisis difficult in sense that ending it depends on whether these two men forged a political understanding.

Interestingly, international groups like International Crisis Group and Human Rights Watch have voiced some concerns about the activities of Justice and Equality Movement led by Dr. Khalil is believed to be a close friend of Turabi (Suleiman, 2005). According to Suleiman (2005), Turabi through international financial institutions provides Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) with financial assistance that JEM uses to finance the war (Suleiman, 2005).

Subsequently, the oil discovery in the Darfur plays an important role in the Darfur conflict. With most of the oil located in the South, Khartoum recent discovery of oil in Darfur region intensified power struggle over who’s to control the newly discovered oil in the region (Verney, 2004). With the possible independent of Southern Sudan, Khartoum has been determined to secure the Darfur’s oil. At the same time, the Darfur rebel groups don’t want oil to be by controlled the Khartoum’s authority. The economic reality in Darfur has created a political struggle over who should control the regional resources particularly the oil revenue (Verney, 2004).

Apart from internal fight over who to control the newly discovered oil, there is international connection to the Darfur conflict (Smith, 2006). Surprisingly as it may sound, there are several countries that are engaged in oil exploration in Darfur. This means the search for oil and conflict in Darfur are somehow related. It is arguable to say that here is no difference between Khartoum’s government and those that buy Sudan’s oil. The Khartoum’s government and countries that buy Sudan’s oil are equally responsible for the suffering of people in Darfur. Each barrel that Khartoum sells to China or Britain for example provides Khartoum authority with money to finance the cost of war in Darfur (Smith, 2006).

It unthinkable for countries like China to admit the role it plays in Darfur’s conflict. However, China participation for example in drilling and buying of Sudan’s oil is a reason to be concerned. However, it is clear that Khartoum’s regime uses the money it gets from the sale of oil to fund the war in Darfur as well the twenty two years long civil war between North and South which ended 5 years ago ( Carin, 2006). It’s the oil money that builds roads, and bridges which Khartoum’s government uses to transport its troops to murder innocent people in Darfur. It is unfortunate to see the world blindsided by it thirst for Sudan oil to sponsor a catastrophic human tragedy of a genocidal proportion.

Some people question whether Khartoum’s government and countries that are involved in oil business in Darfur can be blamed for what is happening in Darfur. The question is how people will know the extent of the foreign involvement in Sudan. The answer depends who is asked. There is no doubt that present of China, India, Malaysia, and Britain oil companies in Sudan are not related to what is happening in Darfur. The fact that countries like China invested so much interest in Sudan oil is a sign of how foreign investments have significantly contributed to the magnitude of the conflict (Brian, 2006). It is also self evident in the nature of weaponries that Khartoum government is using. The availability and use of Russian Jets and other Chinese trademark weapons are examples of foreign involvement (Carin, 2006). There is less doubt that countries who buy Sudan’s oil are not partially responsible for death of people, and destruction of properties in Darfur.

In 2007 for example, UN Security Council introduced a resolution to sanction and hold the perpetuators of Darfur war accountable for their actions. And what happened? China and Russia objected the Security Council resolution (Verney, 2004). Of course, their objection was a political decision to protect their own interest in Sudan. Because of China and Russia objection, the UN resolution was watered down to a weak resolution acceptable to both China and Russia, while war criminals are at large with hundreds of lives vanishing each day with little hope for tomorrow (Verney, 2004).

While the world is debating about Darfur, thousands of lives are being lost, homes destroyed, countless innocent children are becoming orphans in the hand of a brutal regime that cares less for human life (UNAMID Update, 2007). The silence left people wondering, what should the people do to bring this human suffering under control? Of course, the burden is on the international community to bring Darfur conflict to end. United Nations and the rest of the international community need to work hard to bring Khartoum’s government and Darfur rebel groups to a negotiating table.

First, the international community needs to start sponsoring meaningful dialogue between Khartoum and Darfur rebel groups. Second, UN has to recognize that Khartoum is a part of the problem and can be a part of the solution if it stops supporting Janjaweed militias (UNAMID Update, 2007). Issuing warrant to arrest president Bashiir needs not to be the immediate concern of the UN. The world needs to worry more about how to stop blood before worrying about bring president Bashiir to justice. The world needs to engage Bashiir and work with him to find a political solution to the Darfur crisis. If Bashiir however does not act in a manner that satisfies the international community, then it should be appropriate for the UN to invoke Chapter VI or VII to force Bashir to comply with the demands of the international community (United Nations, 2008).

International community has to do more than just offering monetary assistance to feed the starving people of Darfur. It should put more emphasis on severe sanctions including military option to bring those behind this disaster to justice. If those individuals who are committing war crimes, crimes of war, and crimes against humanity are held accountable. Other people who share the same view may back off or start behaving humanely. Such action could help to reverse the intensity of conflict as fewer people would be interested in committing such dreadful crimes (Human Rights Watch, 2005).

Moreover, International community have to recognize that African Union (AU) is weak to deal with Darfur conflict and it humanitarian aftermath. AU is understaffed, poorly financed to deal with the scope of this crisis in such large territory (UNAMID Update, 2007). The current level of African Union troops coupled with the lack of logistical supports from African countries should be seen as a great concern and a sign that AU will not deal with the problem by itself. In other words, the conflict is not going to die if United Nations, European Union and the United States don’t step in and assume their global responsibility (United Nations, 2008).

Given the magnitude of the suffering of people in the region, there is nothing wrong with changing the regime in Khartoum. The world has done it in Iraqi. It can be done again in Sudan if that what it takes to save life in Darfur. There is no doubt , changing Khartoum’s regime might be costly, but it would be the right thing to do instead of the world to distance itself from Darfur conflict hoping that Cambodia or Rwandan genocide never repeated itself again (Dziedizic, 2002, p. 69-99). It is not going to be long before the world realizes that the 21st century genocide has already occurred in Sudan. It is better for the world to act soon rather to wait for regretful moments as the world did after the 1994 Rwandan’s genocide.

Internally, all Sudanese have to realize that they can solve their national dispute without using bullets. Sudanese need to come together and recognize their diversities, and religious differences among their societies (Verney, 2004). They have to start thinking about living together as one people. Politically, the future of Sudan is with the country political parties. They are the ones that are ruining the country and they would be the ones that would put the country back together again. Parties like Sudan People Liberation Movement(SPLM) which runs the semi autonomous government of the South Sudan have greater political leverage to bring other parties to work together to implement the Darfur Peace Protocol (Kwaje, 2003). The greater fear is that, if parties like Sudan People Liberation Movement and National Congress Party don’t work together. The situation in Sudan would likely deteriorate, and this could pitch the country back into a bloody war the world has never seen in the 21st Century.

In conclusion, the Darfur conflict can be understood in the context of colonial history of the country. It can be traced back to struggle over farming land, food shortage which led to hunger and made many people so susceptible to politicians’ manipulations (Suleiman, 2005) The British government which ruled Sudan did not help shape the future of the country either. Instead, it encouraged division through it’s polices of indirect rules in which it favored one group over others which sown ethnic hatred among major tribes in the country (Amnesty International n.d.).

Also, Sudan’s government played an important role in orchestrating the Darfur conflict. It’s failed to implement kind of social policies and programs that could have helped to tackle the country’s problems effectively in a peaceful manner. For instance, it should have sought relentless negotiation with different dissatisfied rebel groups as well as seeking international financial assistances to address poverty which has made many people so vulnerable to political manipulations. Instead, it’s instituted unfair policies that have oppressed many people resulting into unfortunate situation in Darfur.


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